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THE  MILITIA  AS  ORGANIZED  UNDER  THE  CONSTi- 

TUTION  AND  ITS  VALUE  TO  THE  NATION 

AS  A  MILITARY  ASSET 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  7835-9 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


516 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  516. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


vo 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Constitutional  provisions  relating  to  power  of  Congress  to  raise  troops 5 

2.  Militia  law  of  1792 5 

3.  Militia  laws  of  1808  and  1820 5 

4.  Failure  of  the  system 6 

5.  Worthlessness  of  militia , 6 

6.  Act  of  1898 6 

7.  The  Organized  Militia  as  an  asset  in  preparing  war  plans 7 

8.  Failure  or  refusal  of  troops  to  serve 7 

9.  Lack  of  physical  fitness 8 

10.  Time  for  concentrating 9 

11.  Character  of  force  assembled 9 

12.  Time  this  force  may  be  held  for  service 10 

13.  How  this  force  may  be  used 10 

14.  Wastefulness  of  the  system 10 

15.  As  cause  for  delay  in  raising  a  volunteer  force 11 

16.  Number  of  Organized  Militia  and  amount  of  training  of  those  secured  by  the 

call 11 

17.  The  organizations  of  Organized  Militia  and  training  of  personnel  as  an  asset.  11 

18.  How  present  Organized  Militia  has  improved 12 

19.  Conclusions 12 

30669°— No.  616 16  (3) 


6G7373 


THE   MILITIA   AS   ORGANIZED   UNDER    THE    CONSTITU- 
TION AND  ITS  VALUE  TO  THE  NATION  AS  A  MILITARY 

ASSET. 


1.  UNDER  THE  CONSTITUTION  THERE  ARE  TWO  WAYS  OF  RAISING 

TROOPS. 

(a)  Directly  under  the  power  of  Congress  u  to  raise  and  support 
armies."     (Art.  1,  sec.  8,  par.  11.) 

(b)  Indirectly  under  (art.  1,  sec.  8,  par.  14)  the  power  "to  pro- 
vide for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions." 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  45)  But  for  the  valuelessness  of  the 
militia  (and  other  short-term  troops),  the  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion which  authorizes  the  Federal  Government  "  to  raise  and  support 
armies"  would  probably  never  have  been  adopted,  because  of  the 
traditional  fear  of  a  standing  army.  As  it  was,  this  provision  was 
bitterly  opposed  and  barely  received  enough  votes  to  be  carried. 

The  omission  of  the  clause  would  have  resulted  in  a  dependence 
upon  militia  alone. 

2.  THE  FIRST  IMPORTANT  MILITIA  ACT  WAS  THAT  OF  1792. 

This  act  provided  for  compulsory  enlistment  and  the  performance 
of  military  duty  by  every  able-bodied  male  between  18  and  45,  and 
required  their  enrollment  as  State  militia;  hence,  for  the  United 
States  to  raise  Regulars  or  Volunteers  under  this  act  would  be  an  en- 
croachment upon  a  body  already  subject  to  the  State  as  militia. 

As  this  act  carried  no  appropriation  for  arms,  equipment,  enroll- 
ment, etc.,  and  as  there  was  no  penalty  for  failure  to  carry  out  its 
provisions,  and  as  there  was  no  way  to  coerce  the  governors  of  States, 
it  resulted  that  the  States  gradually  assumed  the  power  of  legislating 
for  the  militia — the  war  power  was  practically  turned  over  to  the 
governors. 

3.  MILITIA  LAWS  OF  1808  (1661)  AND  1820. 

In  1808  Congress  appropriated  an  annual  sum  for  arms  and  equip- 
ment ;  in  1820  it  passed  an  act  requiring  that  field  exercises  and  dis- 
cipline in  the  militia  should  be  as  observed  in  the  Regular  Army. 
516  (5) 


4.  FAILURE  OF  THE  SYSTEM. 

The  failure  of  the  system  in  use  during  the  Revolution  and  subse- 
quently was  largely  due  to  short  enlistments,  method  of  securing 
officers,  and  lack  of  control  by  the  Federal  Government. 

The  system  was  a  failure  during  the  Revolution  and  in  every  suc- 
ceeding war.  This  was  particularly  true  of  militia  (and  it  was  true 
for  other  classes  of  troops  where  the  Federal  Government  failed  to 
assert  its  power  or  relinquished  it) . 

5.  WORTHLESSNESS  OF  THE  MILITIA. 

To  show  its  lack  of  value  as  a  military  asset  the  following  state- 
ments are  quoted  from  the  writings  of  George  Washington: 

(A  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  42)  Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to 
keep  50,000  or  100,000  in  constant  pay  than  to  depend  upon  one  half  the  number 
and  supply  the  other  half  occasionally  by  militia. 

The  time  the  latter  are  in  pay  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assembling 
and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the  consumption  of  stores  which 
*  *  *  they  must  be  furnished  with  or  sent  home,  added  to  the  other  inci- 
dental expenses  consequent  upon  their  coming  and  conduct  in  camp,  surpass 
all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind  of  regularity  and  economy  which  you  could 
establish  among  fixed  and  settled  troops  and  will  in  my  opinion  prove,  if  the 
scheme  is  adhered  to,  the  ruin  of  our  cause  *  *  *.  For  if  I  was  called  upon 
to  declare  upon  oath  whether  the  militia  have  been  more  serviceable  or  hurtful, 
I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter    *     *     *. 

(A.  W.  G.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  43)  That  an  annual  army  raised  on  the  spur  of 
the  occasion,  besides  being  unqualified  for  the  end  designed,  is  *  *  *  ten 
times  more  expensive    *     *     *. 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  44)  The  only  things  that  counted  for  efficiency 
were  length  of  service  and  military  experience  of  the  officers. 

The  above  quotations  are  just  as  true  to-day  as  they  were  nearly 
140  years  ago. 

6.  VOLUNTEER  ACT  OF  1898  AND  LATER  MILITIA  ACTS. 

The  volunteer  act  of  1898  was  based  on  the  Constitution.  It  pro- 
vided for  a  force  that  could  be  used  at  home  or  abroad  and  for  gen- 
eral military  purposes,  and  did  not  attempt  to  use  a  force  that  the 
Constitution  restricted  to  three  specific  purposes.  Legislation  since 
then  has  gone  backward  and  makes  the  attempt  to  use  what  the  ex- 
perience of  140  years  has  shown  to  be  not  a  dependable  force  on 
account  of  constitutional  limitations.  The  latest  militia  laws  are 
those  of  January  21, 1903,  May  27, 1908,  April  21, 1910,  and  April  25, 
1914  (volunteer  law). 

These  laws  do  not  correct  known  defects  in  the  militia,  even  those 
that,  the  Constitution  not  preventing,  might  be  corrected. 

516 


"  The  laws  governing  the  transition  from  the  service  otf  the 
State  to  the  service  of  the  United  States  are  more  indefinite  and  more 
liable  to  lead  to  confusion  and  embarrassment  than  they  ever  were 
before."     (3702  Congressional  Record,  1911.) 

7.  THE  MILITIA  AS  AN  ASSET  IN  CARRYING  OUT  PLANS  FOR  THE 

NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

To  be  of  real  value  as  an  asset  in  preparing  war  plans  it  should 
be  possible  to  answer  the  question,  What  percentage  of  the  present 
personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia,  or  as  it  would  be  at  the  time  the 
President  issues  his  call,  will  be  available  ? 

This  question  can  not  be  answered  even  approximately. 

The  last  report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (1914)  gave  the  strength  of 
the  Organized  Militia  (mobile)  as  113,929,  but  this  does  not  repre- 
sent the  number  available  in  preparing  war  plans. 

In  the  first  place  there  is  a  dual  responsibility,  the  governor  and 
the  President,  and  there  may  be  conflict. 

The  President  would  issue  his  call  through  the  governors  of  States. 
(Sec.  4,  act  of  1908.)  He  can  not  issue  the  call  directly  to  the 
Organized  Militia  officers  as  was  possible  before  (under  the  act  of 
1903). 

If  certain  governors  were  not  in  sympathy  with  the  war.  (In 
1812  the  governors  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  and  later  the 
governors  of  Vermont,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Ten- 
nessee, Arkansas,  and  Missouri  refused  to  call  forth  the  militia  in 
response  to  the  President's  call.) 

If  their  constituents  fear  their  own  section  will  be  attacked; 

If  great  political  pressure  is  exerted  to  prevent  militia  of  certain 
States  being  sent  to  the  place  designated  by  the  President ; 

If  certain  governors  should  disband  the  Organized  Militia  in  their 
States  (West  Virginia,  South  Carolina,  Nevada,  and  Kansas  gov- 
ernors have  done  this)  ;  then  the  President's  action  would  be  in  part 
nullified,  and  from  this  cause  alone  the  resultant  force  might  easily 
be  considerably  less  than  the  existing  Organized  Militia. 

8.  FAILURE  OR  REFUSAL  OF  TROOPS  TO  SERVE. 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  IV,  p.  37)  "  The  response  to  the  call  for 
volunteers  under  the  act  of  April  22,  1898,  at  once  illustrated  the 
worthlessness  of  the  existing  militia  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  Regular 
Army.     *     *     * " 

"  Of  the  militia  borne  on  the  company  rolls,  many  refused  to  vol- 
unteer upon  reasonable  grounds,  25  per  cent  were  rejected  prior  to 
muster,  and  25  per  cent  were  rejected  on  physical  examination  after 
muster." 

616 


8 

The  Organized  Militia  is  better  trained,  officered,  equipped,  and 
disciplined  than  in  1898,  but  men  are  about  the  same  now  as  always, 
and  if  they  are  not  inclined  to  serve  in  war  they  will  find  a  way  to 
avoid  service. 

Section  7,  act  of  1908,  provides : 

That  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the  Organized  Militia  who  shall  refuse  or 
neglect  to  present  himself  for  such  muster,  upon  being  called  forth  as  herein 
prescribed,  shall  be  subject  to  trial  by  court-martial  and  shall  be  punished  as 
such  court-martial  may  direct. 

Under  this  provision  it  is  not  believed  to  be  practicable  to  try 
and  punish  such  offenders.  It  might  be  used  as  a  threat,  but  it  is 
not  believed  that  it  will  deter  many  who  do  not  wish  to  serve. 

9.  LACK  OF  PHYSICAL  FITNESS. 

Section  7  of  act  of  1908  further  provides : 

And  without  further  medical  examination  previous  to  such  muster,  except 
for  those  States  and  Territories  which  have  not  adopted  the  standard  of  medi- 
cal examination  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army. 

Because  the  standard  for  medical  examination  prescribed  for  the 
Regular  Army  has  been  adopted  by  the  States  it  does  not  follow 
that  they  conform.  Those  who  have  inspected  the  Organized  Militia 
know  this,  and  men  not  qualified  physically  would  shortly  have  to 
be  discharged  and  might*  later  become  unworthy  pension  claimants. 
(457  A.  R.  (b).) 

The  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Militia  Division,  page  33  (1914), 
under  the  column  headed  "  Not  apparently  conforming,  etc.,  *  *  *" 
a  total  of  3,218  is  shown;  the  last  column  of  table  on  page  33  shows 
720  discharged  for  physical  unfitness. 

If  the  necessarily  superficial  examination  showed  3,218  unfit,  it 
is  believed  a  searching  examination  would  reveal  several  times  such 
number  unfit. 

Page  206  of  the  report  above  mentioned  shows  that  the  Organized 
Militia  is  16,000  short  of  the  (old)  minimum,  and  further  states: 

In  no  State  is  the  prescribed  peace  strength  of  all  organizations  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  maintained  and  that  in  many  instances  the  deficiency  has  reached 
such  a  figure  as  to  leave  the  corresponding  organizations  such  in  name  only — 
organizations  of  no  value  as  a  military  asset  to  the  Federal  Government. 

It  is  believed  that  many  organization  commanders  are  very  lax 
as  to  physical  qualifications  in  order  to  secure  the  prescribed  mini- 
mum. 

If  all  of  the  organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  could  be  kept 
up  to  the  prescribed  minimum  with  men  qualified  physically,  the 
situation  would  not  be  so  bad,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  demonstrated 
that,  due  to   (a)   labor  opposition,   (b)  objections  of  employers  to 

516 


absence  of  employees,  (c)  lack  of  inclination,  interest,  incentive,  etc., 
it  can  not  be  done.  So  that  for  reasons  enumerated  above  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  as  many  as  75,000  of  the  existing  would  actually  be  obtained. 

10.  TIME  FOR  CONCENTRATING. 

Due  to  variations  in  distance  from  the  point  of  concentration, 
the  varying  promptness  of  the  various  governors  in  acting,  the  vary- 
ing degrees  of  readiness  to  move,  of  the  organizations  themselves, 
there  will  result  an  assembling  of  a  percentage  (unknown)  of  the 
Organized  Militia  by  driblets  over  a  considerable  period  of  time 
(not  determinable). 

11.  CHARACTER  OF  THE  FORCE  ASSEMBLED. 

Section  18  of  the  act  of  1903  requires,  for  participating  in  certain 
funds  distributed  by  the  Federal  Government,  participation  in  five 
days'  camp  or  march  and  24  periods  of  instruction. 

Assuming  that  a  man  attended  five  days'  camp  and  24  drills  of 
1|  hours  each,  he  would  have  received  about  60  hours  instruction  in 
a  year. 

The  last  report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (p.  7)  states  that  "over  30 
per  cent  failed  to  attend  24  drills"  and  that  "it  is  believed  to  be  a 
safe  conclusion  that  not  a  single  unit  at  its  maximum  strength 
marched  a  distance  of  10  miles  fully  equipped  and  armed." 

The  personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia  is  constantly  changing. 
Table,  page  33,  Report  of  Chief  of  Militia  Division  (1914),  shows 
over  35  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  men  served  less  than  one  year;  over 
74  per  cent  less  than  three  years. 

In  three  years  the  maximum  amount  of  instruction  received  by  any 
man  would  probably  never  exceed  180  hours — this  would  be  an  ex- 
ceptional case.  The  instruction  would  vary  during  a  three  years' 
period  from  180  hours  to  0,  with  average  instruction  of,  say,  90  hours. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  man  with  approximately  180  hours 
instruction  has  almost  reached  the  end  of  his  enlistment  and  no 
sooner  will  he  reach  the  concentration  camp  than  the  question  of  his 
discharge  must  be  considered. 

The  lowest  estimate  of  any  competent  authority  as  to  the  time 
necessary  to  train  a  man  to  be  an  efficient  soldier,  with  intensive 
training,  under  experienced  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  is 
1,500  hours.  It  is  apparent  how  far  the  average  enlisted  man  in  the 
Organized  Militia  with  under  90  hours  (15  days)  instruction,  and 
even  the  man  with  the  maximum  training,  falls  short. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  entire  personnel  might  have  been  replaced 
by  raw  material  and  the  average  instruction  reduced  to  zero,  with 
nothing  as  an  asset  left  but  the  organization,  if  that  be  an  asset. 

516 


10 

There  may  have  been  enough  raw  material  added  to  bring  existing 
organizations  up  to  "war  strength,"  but  in  this  case  the  average 
instruction  would  thereby  be  reduced  to  about  40  hours  or,  say,  the 
equivalent  of  seven  days. 

12.  TIME  THIS  FORCE  MAY  BE  HELD  FOR  SERVICE. 

Section  4  of  the  act  of  1908  (amending  sec.  5  of  1903)  states — 

He  may  specify  in  his  call  the  period  for  which  such  service  is  required 

•    *.   * . 

And— 
no  commissioned  officer,  etc.,    *    *    *    shall  be  held  to  service  beyond  the  term 
of  his  existing  commission  or  enlistment    *     *     *. 

Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the  best  trained  men  would  soon  begin  to 
drop  out. 

13.  HOW  THIS  FORCE  MAY  BE  USED. 

The  Constitution  and  laws  based  thereon  provide  that  it  may  be 
used  "  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and 
repel  invasions." 

Section  4  of  act  of  1908  (amending  sec.  5,  1903)  provides:  "shall 
continue  to  serve  *  *  *  either  within  or  without  the  territory 
of  the  United  States    *     *    *." 

But  the  Attorney  General  held,  February  17,  1912 — 

I  think  that  the  constitutional  provision  here  considered  not  only  affords  no 
warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia  by  the  General  Government,  except  to  sup- 
press insurrection,  repel  invasions,  or  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  but,  by 
its  careful  enumeration  of  the  three  occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia 
may  be  used,  it  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose. 

14.  WASTEFULNESS  OF  SYSTEM. 

The  Secretary  of  War  states  on  page  7  in  his  "  Outline  of  Proposed 
Military  Palicy,"  November  1,  1915 — 

Federal  Government  appropriates  $6,614,532.13  annually  for  or  on  behalf  of 
the  National  Guard. 

The  States  individually  appropriate  for  their  respective  guards  an  aggregate 
of  $6,244,214.98  annually— 

or  a  total  of  $12,858,747.11. 

This  sum,  at  a  cost  per  man  of  $914,  would  support  14,068  trained 
men  constantly  in  service. 

Or  figuring  the  entire  cost  of  supporting  a  reserve  at  one-fifth 
the  cost  of  troops  with  the  colors,  the  above  sum  would  support 
70,340  men,  trained  and  ready  for  immediate  service. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  sum  might  better  be  used  to 
support  such  trained  reserve  as  against  a  possible  75,000  Organized 

516 


11 

Militia  with  an  average  of  90  hours'  training — for  limited  uses  only — 
with  inexperienced  officers  available  as  first-line  troops  at  some 
distant  date,  probably  six  to  nine  months. 

The  Canadian  militia,  with,  possibly,  training  equal  to  that  of  our 
average  Organized  Militia,  was  not  considered  fit  for  duty  on  the 
Continent  until  more  than  six  months  after  their  arrival  in  England. 
Many  (10  per  cent)  of  the  Canadian  Militia  had  to  be  returned  as 
unfit  for  military  service. 

15.  AS  DETERRING  THE  RAISING  OF  VOLUNTEERS. 

Section  4  of  act  of  1908,  amending  section  5  of  act  of  1903,  pro- 
vides : 

The  Organized  Militia  shall  be  called  into  service  of  the  United  States  In 
advance  of  any  volunteer  force  which  it  may  be  determined  to  raise. 

Section  3  of  the  act  of  1914  provides  that  when  three-fourths  of 
the  minimum  strength  of  each  organization  volunteers  *  *  *  it 
may  be  received  into  the  volunteer  forces  in  advance  of  other  organ- 
izations, etc.     *     *     * 

It  is  believed  that  these  sections  will  have  the  effect  of  holding  up 
volunteering  until  it  is  known  what  the  Organized  Militia  is  going 
to  do  and  how  many  are  coming  into  the  service  as  militia  or  as 
volunteers. 

16.  NUMBER  OF  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  AND  AMOUNT  OF  TRAINING 

OF  THOSE  SECURED  BY  THE  CALL. 

When  the  Organized  Militia  is  concentrated  in  response  to  the 
President's  call,  we  will  have  of  the  existing  Organized  Militia  per- 
sonnel, as  militia  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  a  force 
certainly  not  exceeding  75,000,  with  average  instruction  not  exceeding 
90  hours,  with  officers  appointed  by  the  governors,  trained  by  the 
States,  with  constitutional  limitations  as  to  the  purposes  for  which 
it  may  be  used.  As  to  those  organizations  which  decide  to  volunteer, 
the  same  defects  would  exist  except  the  last. 

17.  THE  ORGANIZATIONS  OF  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  AND  TRAINING 

OF  PERSONNEL  AS  AN  ASSET. 

Reorganization  of  the  Land  Forces  (p.  58)  states: 

*  *  *  is  a  force  actually  in  being  and  one  composed  largely  of  officers  and 
men  who  have  volunteered  for  military  training  because  they  desire  to  serve  as 
soldiers  in  the  event  of  war.  The  Organized  Militia,  in  short,  constitutes  an 
existing  organization. 

It  has  been  stated  further : 

Aside  from  the  Regular  Army,  It  is  the  only  organized  military  force  In  the 
United  States.  *  *  *  Except  the  military  department  in  certain  schools, 
It  has  been  the  only  source  of  instruction  in  military  matters  for  the  citizen 

516 


12 

who  does  not  devote  his  whole  time  to  the  military  profession.     It  may  bo 

fully  admitted  that  the  training  received  has  not  been  an  adequate  return  for 

the  money  expended,  but  that  training  has  not  been  entirely  without  value. 
*     *     * 

Many  of  the  officers  of  the  Organized  Militia  have  been  enthusiastic  students 
of  military  subjects  and  have  acquired  a  theoretical  and  practical  knowledge 
which  would  be  of  value  to  the  Government  in  time  of  war.     *     »     * 

It  has  been  alleged  also  that — 

even  skeleton  organizations  are  of  value  to  build  on  in  an  emergency. 

18.  HOW  PRESENT  ORGAMzSd  MILITIA  HAS  IMPROVED. 

The  militia  laws  now  in  force  are  not  an  improvement,  generally, 
over  the  earliest,  and  do  not  improve  the  system  that  has  always 
obtained. 

More  attention  has  been  given  to  the  Organized  Militia  by  the 
Federal  Government.  Money  has  been  appropriated  in  larger  sums 
for  various  purposes.  Officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army 
have  been  designated  to  assist.  Improvement  has  been  made  in  con- 
sequence, but  the  system  itself  is  bad,  and  a  really  dependable  force 
can  not  be  produced  without  the  correction  of  well-known  defects. 

There  should  be  complete  Federal  control  as  to  appointment  of 
officers,  amount  of  training,  as  to  when  and  where  it  may  be  used 
(constitutional  amendment  necessary  to  make  the  militia  such  a 
force). 

Enlistments  should  be  long  or  for  the  war. 

Should  be  a  reserve,  supply  depots,  etc. 

19.  CONCLUSIONS. 

What  is  required  is  to  secure  quickly  at  the  outbreak  of  war  a 
force  of  trained  men.  This  can  only  be  done  by  making  the  neces-f 
sary  preparations  before  war  comes.  The  Organized  Militia  will 
not  produce  such  a  force.  It  can  be  provided  by  a  system  based  on  a; 
combination  of  volunteering  and  conscription  with  Federal  control. 

As  "continued  reliance  upon  the  Organized  Militia  has  actually, 
stood  in  the  way  of  our  getting  anything  better,"  it  would  seem  the! 
wisest  policy  to  place  no  dependence  upon  such  a  questionable  asset! 
as  the  Organized  Militia  and  to  replace  it  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment  by  a  proper  Federal  force. 

It  is  not  believed  that  the  military  instruction  possessed  by  officers  j 
and  enlisted  men  of  the  Organized  Militia  should  be  wasted,  but; 
their  training  and  military  knowledge  should  be  utilized  to  the 
utmost  in  the  preparation  of  the  Federal  force  above  mentioned. 

516 


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